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ABSTRACT
The “new wars” of the post-Cold War period pose unique challenges
for conflict resolution. Frequently, the international community has
tried to manage these conflicts using fairly ad hoc and uncoordinat-
ed approaches that, while suited to traditional interstate disputes,
are largely ineffective in the deconstructed settings of contemporary
internal wars. In this article I attempt to construct an alternative
framework for international mediation that could act as a general
guide for policy makers. An examination of the Mozambique peace
process reveals an important set of lessons. First, non-official medi-
ators – NGOs, churches, prominent individuals – need to be main-
streamed into diplomatic initiatives, particularly in partnership with
insider-mediators. Second, there are key roles for mediators in the
pre-negotiation phase, such as negotiator training of the rebel rep-
resentatives who may be inexperienced in diplomatic bargaining.
Third, mediation initiatives should be coordinated and sequenced to
avoid the frequent problem of mediator “crowdedness.” Fourth,
high-ranking and powerful third parties like heads of state should be
used as impasse-breakers. Fifth, a wide range of technical experts –
in the military, constitutional, electoral, economic development
fields – need to be included in the agreement design phase of the
mediation. Lastly, there needs to be long-term engagement into the
implementation and post-conflict reconstruction phases. It is at this
point that mediators are most needed, and yet frequently – as in the
Middle East – it is at this stage that they are most often absent. 
Richard Jackson is a Lecturer in international security at the Centre for
International Politics at the University of Manchester, UK.
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INTRODUCTION
International mediation in the so-called “new wars”1 of the post-Cold War
world is better known for its failures than its successes. In the 1990s, it took three
separate agreements – the Cotonou Agreement in 1993, the first Abuja
Agreement in 1995, and Abuja II in 1996 – brokered by international mediators
(the first two failing completely) to finally bring a semblance of peace to Liberia
in 1997. Fighting erupted again in 1999 and only ended in 2004 when Charles
Taylor was persuaded to go into exile in Nigeria. In Angola, a full and final peace
settlement was mediated in the 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord only for the fighting
to re-erupt in 1992 at an even greater level of ferocity than before. The pattern of
mediated agreements followed by further fighting continued in Angola until the
death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002. In Somalia, the joint US/UN peace effort suc-
ceeded in bringing together warlords and faction leaders for mediated talks in
several rounds in 1993-94. International mediation failed to settle the conflict,
however, and the US/UN-led peace effort collapsed in ignominy in 1994.
Mediation in the Balkans – at least a partial success in some minds – has failed
to solve any of the deeper underlying issues, and an uneasy peace is only main-
tained by the presence of tens of thousands of heavily armed NATO troops.
Finally, in Rwanda the mediated agreements in the Arusha Accords of 1993 were
at the very least incapable of preventing the subsequent genocide, and at worst,
partly responsible for it.2 In numerous other internal conflicts – Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Colombia, Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea, Central
African Republic, Chechnya, Kashmir, Israel-Palestine – international mediation
failed (and continues to fail) to make any significant difference to the course of
the conflict. Unsurprisingly, this sad litany has engendered a growing sense of
pessimism about the ability of international third parties to effectively deal with
contemporary forms of conflict.3
This article argues that the failures of international mediation are due in
large part to the persistence of a model of mediation that is unsuited to the kinds
of conflicts it is being applied to, namely, internal conflicts or new wars. A
power-based model of mediation aimed at “balancing” interests, it is more suit-
ed to relatively simple interstate disputes and the world of international diplo-
macy. What is desperately needed is an alternative model of international medi-
ation oriented toward the unique conflict resolution challenges posed by internal
conflicts, and based on sound theoretical development and the practical experi-
ence of mediators. I argue that such a model is beginning to emerge both in the
theoretical literature and in international practice, and this article is a further con-
tribution to its articulation. An empirical examination of the peace process lead-
ing to the conclusion of the civil war in Mozambique reveals the broad parame-
ters and potentialities of an alternative model of international mediation.
Interestingly, the Oslo peace process leading up to the 1993 Oslo Accords is also
an example of this alternative approach in action,4 as is the Inter-Tadjik Dialogue
of 1994.
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The first section of this article offers a critique of the current dominant
model of international mediation, arguing that it is unsuited to the challenges
posed by internal conflicts. While it may be a useful approach to managing inter-
state conflict, it is proving to be largely ineffective in dealing with the new wars.
The second section offers a brief theoretical outline of an alternative model of
mediation for internal conflicts. Based on the notion of multi-track diplomacy, a
clear division of labor and coordination with other relevant actors and agencies,
and with a long-term orientation and the prioritization of building process as well
as outcome, this model is then fleshed out through an empirical case study in the
final part. The Mozambique peace process offers important insights as to pre-
cisely how such a model of mediation might be implemented in practice. 
Defining Mediation
Mediation, as it is defined here, is a form of bargaining in which the par-
ties to a dispute seek the assistance of or accept an offer of help from, a party not
directly involved in the conflict to resolve their differences without invoking or
applying the authority of the law.5 The transformation of a dyadic negotiation
system into a triadic, mediated-negotiation system6 results in numerous possibil-
ities for mediators to influence the relationship and communication with and
between the parties. The mediator also brings to the conflict management process
a range of additional material and non-material resources, such as reputation,
skills, and influence. Mediation, in other words, can “expand the pie,” thereby
creating inducements for peace. Mediation should not be conceived of as a uni-
form process or a set of discrete activities. Rather, mediation involves a contin-
uous set of related processes involving actors, relationships, decisions, resources,
and settings. Depending on the wishes of the disputing parties, it can be con-
ducted formally or informally, in secret or in the open, by top leaders or low-level
representatives, and with closed or open-ended agendas. It is therefore, a highly
flexible form of voluntary, non-binding, decision-making.  
PROBLEMS FACING INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION
The current practice of international mediation is problematic at two lev-
els. First, the “theory” or “model” of traditional diplomatic mediation is funda-
mentally flawed in regards to internal conflicts. One of its greatest problems is
that the underlying assumptions about the nature and causes of the new wars are
generally misconceived and misinterpreted. This diagnostic failure is then,
unsurprisingly, translated into remedial intervention failure. For example, there
is a tendency among policy makers and strategic analysts in particular, to view
international security in traditional Clausewitzian terms. Such a statist approach
assumes that groups in conflict operate according to defined hierarchies of
power, and the way to manage the conflict then is to identify and work with the
relevant authorities. When clear structures of authority exist this strategy may
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work well. However, in contemporary internal conflicts there is often a multi-
plicity of fluid groups and alliances, and decision-making power is diffuse. In
this situation the strategy of identifying and working with leaders can actually
harm the peace process by empowering a few who may or may not be legitimate
representatives, and by encouraging leaders who want to be taken seriously to
employ military force.7
Another assumption at the heart of diplomatic thought and practice is the
rationalist-positivist notion that conflict is essentially abnormal and aberrant – a
breakdown in the mostly pacific political relations of states. Conceiving of con-
flict in this way, diplomats aim to find compromises that will restore the status
quo and return the relationship back to its “normal” state of affairs. In actual fact
internal conflicts are not “breakdowns” in normally peaceful political systems,
nor the aberrant suspension of non-violent domestic politics.8 Rather, they are the
direct result of a particular form of politics – or a system of conflict – that is root-
ed in the structures and processes of “weak states,”9 and which has its own polit-
ical logic.10 In extreme cases weak state rulers (and their rivals) see great bene-
fits in the creation and maintenance of “war economies.” There is now an
increasingly substantial body of research detailing the significant economic ben-
efits of maintaining “complex emergencies” and the accompanying flow-on
political capital which can accrue.11 From this perspective internal conflicts can
be the direct result of deliberate, rationally calculated strategies aimed at accu-
mulation by state (and non-state) elites. In other words, contrary to convention-
al diplomatic wisdom, 
[I]f we wish to examine conflict we must begin by analysing what is
normal. Or at least, those long-term and embedded social processes
that define the conditions of everyday life. The purpose and reasons
for conflict are located in these processes. From this perspective,
political violence is not different, apart or irrational in relation to the
way we live: it is an expression of its inner logic.12
Contemporary internal conflict therefore, is a social and political system and a
particular kind of totalising discourse; transforming such systems involves tak-
ing a comprehensive approach to the actors who operate it, and the settings in
which it is rooted.13 The orthodox diplomatic approach of cobbling together a
pact among factional leaders is only a superficial palliative in such circum-
stances.  
Another key problem is that diplomatic doctrine and practice – geared to
managing the conflicts of states – denies non-state actors any recognized role and
does not provide adequate means for dealing with conflicts that involve parties
not formally recognized as states.14 This is problematic for several reasons. In the
first instance mediator entry into the conflict may be prohibited when the gov-
ernment faction does not want to confer recognition on the non-governmental
actor(s). Practically, it can make the apparently simple act of convening talks
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nearly impossible. This very problem prevented direct Israeli-PLO talks for
many years and was only overcome by highly secret and officially deniable
meetings. Second, diplomatic mediators are more likely to be biased toward state
actors. For example, it is unlikely that a state or intergovernmental mediator
would ever contemplate secession as a solution to a conflict, and would more
likely work to reinforce the territorial status quo. Diplomacy is rooted in the for-
mation and maintenance of the state system, yet internal groups may be contest-
ing the very nature of existing states.15
The traditional diplomatic approach has been to employ various forms of
soft or hard mediation predicated on the assumption that if a power-sharing
agreement – some form of “balancing” – can be forged between the faction lead-
ers, the conflict can be terminated.16 This approach assumes that armed conflict
is primarily motivated by some form of “national interest” and that solutions lie
within a framework of rational political compromise on these issues, usually
within a relatively short-term frame of reference. In fact, there is frequently a set
of powerful subjective elements to these conflicts – generationally accumulated
misperceptions and stereotypes, deep-rooted hatred, fear, and insecurity, extreme
ethno-nationalist discourses – in addition to the political-economic incentives we
have already mentioned. Negotiations over substantive interests and issues, as
important as they may be for securing an end to the violence, do not by them-
selves solve the underlying conflict dynamics. Without a more comprehensive
approach that seeks to transform the underlying system of conflict, violence is
likely to re-erupt.
The second level, the actual “practice” of international mediation, is unsur-
prisingly also problematic. For instance, the international community has tried to
“manage” these conflicts using fairly ad hoc and uncoordinated approaches that,
perhaps suited to traditional interstate disputes, are nonetheless largely ineffec-
tive in the new setting. In addition to the ad hoc choice of mediators and strate-
gies and the failure to coordinate often multiple diplomatic “tracks,” there has
also been a profound failure to follow through in international mediation. Too
often, diplomatic involvement has ended with the signing of peace accords. The
implementation of the agreements – frequently the most unstable and dangerous
phase of the peace process – has repeatedly been orphaned.17 Further outbreaks
of violence from the principal protagonists or from so-called spoiler groups is
unfortunately a common occurrence. 
Another problem with the model of diplomacy currently in vogue is that
more often than not negotiations are conducted in an intensely public environ-
ment from the very beginning. In the alternative model (see below), negotiations
begin with a private pre-negotiation phase where issues of status, negotiating for-
mat, venue, and agenda are discussed, and only move to public negotiation when
substantive issues are being discussed. In the public model the parties tend to
speak more to the media and to their constituencies – posturing, in other words
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– than to their counterparts. In effect, the problem with international mediation
is, as John Paul Lederach has suggested:
Contemporary conflict has underscored the reality that in many parts
of the world, the identity of people is not organically tied to citizen-
ship in the state, yet the defining paradigm that informs the
approaches for understanding and dealing with these conflicts
remains that of international – in other words, interstate – diploma-
cy. Thus, intervention in internal conflicts is restricted not only by
the charters of the major regional and international institutions but
also by the lack of appropriate and adequate concepts, approaches,
and modalities for intervention. We persist in relying on traditional
statist diplomacy, despite its inadequacies in responding to the nature
of conflicts today.18
To summarize, there has been a failure of adjustment in international institutions
to the realities of the new post-Cold War security challenges. As I have shown,
the dominant mediation model is largely ineffective for the unique challenges of
internal conflicts; and yet there are relatively few attempts to develop an alter-
native approach. In the absence of new forms of diplomacy international institu-
tions have tended to over-rely on peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention,
which in turn, have their own set of problems.19 One of the key challenges fac-
ing conflict resolution scholars and practitioners in the new century, therefore, is
to articulate alternative models and approaches for dealing with internal con-
flicts.
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULATION OF MEDIATION
In the following analysis an alternative framework for mediation in inter-
nal conflicts is constructed that could act as a general guide for policy makers
and a sign-post for further research. Although every conflict has its own unique
history and dynamics and there is no “one size fits all” conflict resolution
approach, it is possible, and indeed advisable, to eschew ad hoc approaches and
design strategies relevant to the nature of the conflict based on sound theoretical
and empirical analysis.
The Context of Mediation
The “post-modern” or new wars of the post-Cold War period pose unique
conflict resolution challenges, not least because they frequently involve accom-
panying complex emergencies. There is an emerging consensus that managing or
resolving internal conflicts involves multi-dimensional, long-term, coordinated
approaches, and that there are key roles for peace-making activities, such as
mediation, types of peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building.20 Cultures of
peace and reconciliation needs to be constructed at the levels of the power bro-
kers (the top-level leadership), the power holders (the middle-range leadership),
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and civil society (grassroots leadership) for long-term stability and reconstruc-
tion to take place.21 A bargain among the power brokers held together by induce-
ments from powerful external actors is not on its own enough to reconfigure the
underlying logic of internal conflict systems.
Mediation among the power brokers, therefore, should be seen as only one
element in a coordinated approach to conflict resolution. Operating at only one
level of society – the level of the power brokers, or the highest political and mil-
itary leaders – it must be undertaken in such a way that it complements rather
than complicates parallel processes at the subsidiary levels and the peace-build-
ing process that follows. Nonetheless, it is often a vital component of the overall
process, since without an end to the large-scale, organized, and systematic vio-
lence other peace-building activities – peacekeeping, reconstruction, reconcilia-
tion – are all put at risk of failure. In other words, international mediation needs
to be re-contextualized in an overall strategic plan or approach. This course
implies that diplomatic mediation also needs to be coordinated with other con-
current activities, such as peacekeeping, reconciliation, national reconstruction,
and activities antecedent to the mediation, such as peace-building. A coordinat-
ed approach also extends to avoiding the all too common situation of multiple,
“crowded” mediation tracks, where a number of diplomatic actors each pursue
their own (sometimes competitive) initiatives. More than one mediation track (at
the top level) allows the protagonists to play the competing mediators off each
other. Sometimes, new mediators need to be resisted, or at least convinced to
support the primary track.
The Process of Mediation
It is not enough, however, to re-contextualize mediation as part of a more
holistic peace-building process. Rather, mediation itself needs to be re-conceptu-
alized and re-formulated. In particular, three underlying orientations need re-vis-
iting. First, the notion of mediation as primarily a diplomatic activity needs to be
challenged. Diplomats are not the only possible mediators and limiting possible
mediators to only one category of actors – recognized state and intergovernmen-
tal diplomats – is no longer judicious or appropriate. International mediation
needs to mainstream and incorporate non-official mediators into its major peace
initiatives, particularly those with a sustained presence in the zones of conflict
and established communication channels with the protagonists. Local actors,
such as churches or humanitarian agencies, are particularly important in this
regard, as they are often trusted and respected for the relief work that they under-
take. Additionally, partnerships between local and external mediators need to be
fostered; it was the combined efforts of the local Catholic Church and an exter-
nal faith-based community that precipitated the break-through in the
Mozambique peace process. 
Second, mediation needs to move from its obsession with negotiated out-
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comes to placing equal importance on the process and the relationship of the par-
ties. As IDEA has observed, “Bad process will greatly impede agreement. It can
even contribute to ultimate failure, no matter how well designed the outcome,
simply because the way in which the talks were structured may cause friction and
distrust and leave at least some parties questioning the legitimacy of the whole
venture.”22 Processes are well established and accepted in interstate diplomacy,
but they are not so well accepted – and rarely even articulated – in internal con-
flict resolution. In internal conflicts building a process that is perceived as fair,
just, and sustainable is probably as, if not more, important than achieving a sat-
isfactory outcome. After all, unlike interstate mediation where the parties do not
necessarily have to live in close proximity to each other, in internal conflicts the
parties may have to share power and manage an ongoing daily relationship.
Building a relationship therefore is critical to long-term success. Part of con-
structing an effective and sustainable process involves devoting more care and
resources to the pre-negotiation phase. 
Third, international mediation needs to move from its short-term orienta-
tion toward a long-term orientation. In particular, focus needs to be sustained
well into the implementation phase. All too often international mediation termi-
nates when the parties sign the general peace agreements, since this step is per-
ceived as being the official conclusion of the conflict. The problem is, of course,
that the prevailing image of a conflict’s official end “creates unrealistic expecta-
tions that the announcement of a tentative settlement means that ‘it’s all over bar
the shouting’, and fails to prepare constituencies to deal intelligently with the
probable cycle of subsidiary disputes.”23 In fact, the implementation of the terms
of the agreement can be the most difficult part of the whole process. The parties
often have differing interpretations of the terms of settlement, all sides are
maneuvering for position in the new dispensation, and there are multiple friction
points. An alternative model of mediation – apart from adopting a more realistic
mental map of the settlement process – would be to prepare for the implementa-
tion phase right from the beginning and put procedures in place to deal with the
inevitable disputes that arise along the way.
Support for the efficacy of such a re-conceptualization of mediation can be
found in several places, including an examination of the Mozambique peace
process. In Mozambique, an alternative model of mediation emerged out of the
non-official peace track. Non-official mediators took a long-term and coordinat-
ed approach that was as much oriented toward a just outcome as it was to con-
structing the foundation of a relationship between the parties. Most importantly,
the approach worked. Although the peace in Mozambique is fragile, it has not
fallen into the all-too familiar pattern of rounds of violence and diplomacy that
have characterized similar conflicts in the DRC, Kashmir, Chechnya, Sri Lanka,
Palestine, and Liberia to name a few.
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LESSONS FROM THE MOZAMBIQUE PEACE PROCESS
The story of the Mozambique peace process is a unique instance of inter-
national mediation in a regional conflict because it is one of the very few cases
where Track II or unofficial diplomacy supplanted official Track I diplomatic
efforts as the primary site for negotiations. Toward the conclusion of the talks,
international diplomatic officials were brought into the process to add legitima-
cy, provide expertise, and add the kinds of resources unavailable to Track II
mediators. The coordination of unofficial and official diplomacy was a rare
example of synergism in international mediation. There are, in fact, relatively
few success stories in the mediation of intractable civil wars of the kind experi-
enced in Mozambique, and even fewer instances of major successes by non-offi-
cial mediators in such major regional conflicts. From this perspective the
Mozambique peace process suggests some important lessons relevant to the
mediation of intractable internal conflicts and to the construction of an alterna-
tive mediation model.
The Community of Sant’Egidio is a voluntary charitable Catholic organi-
zation based in Rome, but with 15,000 members world-wide and 300 local
groups in Europe, Latin America, and Africa.24 With an explicit commitment to
peace and tolerance, Sant’Egidio has combined charitable work and political
activities in numerous conflict-torn countries around the world. The Community
started working in Mozambique in the late 1970s, forging important relationships
with both the Frelimo (Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique) government and
Renamo (Resistencia Nacional de Mocambique) over the next decade. Don
Jaime Goncalves, the Archbishop of Beira, had also formed strong ties with
Sant’Egidio while studying in Rome in 1976, thereby linking the local Catholic
church in Mozambique with the community in Rome. 
In early 1989, while official Track I diplomatic efforts to end the war were
stalled, Mozambican church leaders launched a second track for exploring pos-
sible contacts.25 For nearly a year and a half, Catholic officials acted as an unof-
ficial communications channel between the two sides, meeting with the Frelimo
leader Samora Machel, relaying messages to Renamo, building trust, and offer-
ing suggestions. The Catholic Church in Mozambique, in particular the Catholic
Bishop’s Conference, proved decisive in kick-starting the stalled peace
process26; in fact, it is unlikely that Sant’Egidio would have been so effective
without its partnership. As a consequence of the Church’s activities, in late 1989
and early 1990, Sant’Egidio, together with Archbishop Goncalves and Mario
Raffaelli (an Italian MP), offered to host face-to-face talks between Frelimo and
Renamo officials. The parties agreed to these talks in July 1990, and 11 rounds
and two years of negotiations started. Throughout the talks Goncalves, Raffaelli,
Sant’Egidio’s founder Andrea Riccardi, and Don Matteo Zuppi (a Sant’Egidio
parish priest), acted as the principle mediators. Along the way the Vatican, the
Italian government, the United States, the United Nations, and several other
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interested governments provided support, resources, and, at times, additional
diplomatic mediation. 
The mediation resulted in the signing of the Rome Agreement in October
1992 (sometimes called the General Peace Agreement – GPA). Over the follow-
ing three years, and with the aid of a major UN peacekeeping operation and con-
tinued international mediation, the two armies were demobilized and reintegrat-
ed into a unified national army, free competitive elections were held, a new con-
stitution was adopted, a program of national reconstruction got under way, and a
fragile but sustained peace began to take hold. There is not the space here to
describe the entire mediation, and in any case a thorough account of the talks
already exists.27 It will suffice to draw out a few of the important lessons that are
relevant for mediating in intractable internal conflicts from the narrative. 
The Role of Non-Official Diplomacy
Perhaps one of the most important general lessons from the Mozambique
peace process is that non-official mediators – NGOs, churches, civil associations,
prominent individuals – need to be mainstreamed into diplomatic mediation ini-
tiatives. Non-official or private mediators can play important roles in interna-
tional mediation, including some that official diplomats cannot. In the first
instance, employing non-official mediators can circumvent the “entry” problem
of mediation in internal conflict.28 Convening talks between the protagonists can
sometimes be the most difficult part of the peace process for the simple reason
that the government side may be unwilling to bestow diplomatic recognition on
the rebels for fear of legitimizing their cause. In addition, official mediators,
whether they represent another state or an intergovernmental organization, are
perceived to have self-interested reasons for involvement and may be viewed
suspiciously, especially by the non-state parties to the conflict. Entry to the medi-
ation can be facilitated by the use of non-official mediators who do not automat-
ically confer diplomatic status on the non-state side, and who have transparent
and clearly benign – usually humanitarian – interests to pursue. Sant’Egidio, a
very non-threatening and non-diplomatic actor, with strong humanitarian cre-
dentials and who already had a relationship with both sides, proved to be just
such a mediator in Mozambique. Moreover, their ties to and partnership with the
Catholic Church in Mozambique – an insider intermediary – was crucial to
securing entry to the conflict.
Second, establishing informal (deniable), and trustworthy channels of
communication is a vital step in the process, especially during the pre-negotia-
tion phase when both sides are feeling each other out. Often, non-official actors
like NGOs have a presence on the ground in zones of conflict that gives them
access to both sides, and may be the most effective, regular, and reliable channel
of communication between the protagonists. Official mediators may find it diffi-
cult to even contact rebel leaders, and may be distrusted when they do. In
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Mozambique, Sant’Egidio developed a relationship of trust and credibility with
Renamo through aid and development activities, and a working presence in
zones controlled by the rebels.29 A network of Sant’Egidio members, linked to
parishes and missionaries and working among war victims, provided a commu-
nication channel of a kind unavailable to most diplomatic actors. At the same
time, Sant’Egidio had established important links with the Mozambique govern-
ment as a result of facilitating contacts between the Holy See and the government
of Samora Machel in 1985. While some governments in the region had private
channels to Renamo, such as Kenya which was the only government willing to
give Renamo travel documents, they were usually viewed with great suspicion
by the Mozambique government as being Renamo patrons. From early 1989 to
June 1990, as we have said, each side made extensive use of the good offices of
both the Catholic Church in Mozambique and Sant’Egidio to establish contact at
a non-official level, exchange proposals and ideas without being forced into
commitments, and prepare the ground for later substantive talks. Similar efforts
by South African and US diplomats in the 1980s had failed.
Third, non-official mediators sometimes have an advantage in gaining the
trust of the non-state protagonists in particular, precisely because they are not
representative of any state or any state organization. States and intergovernmen-
tal organizations tend to stick together and look out for each other’s interests, and
are often perceived as being biased against non-state actors like secessionist or
rebel movements. As Muthiah Alagappa has observed, the problem with inter-
governmental organizations becoming involved in internal conflicts is that “their
status quo character leads them to favor incumbents. Governments tend to sup-
port one another.”30 Low-level, non-official contacts, on the other hand, can
build an atmosphere of trust and confidence in the crucially important first phase
of the mediation. Non-official mediators are well equipped for facilitating this
process as they are non-threatening to either side, lacking as they do any coer-
cive capabilities or potentially threatening agendas. In particular, respected reli-
gious figures, like those from Sant’Egidio and Catholic Church officials, can
“provide a level of reassurance that official diplomats are often hard-pressed to
equal.”31
The Importance of Pre-Negotiation
Pre-negotiation is broadly speaking “talking about talking,” and its impor-
tance cannot be overstated.32 More specifically it may be defined as: 
Pre-negotiation begins when one or more parties considers negotia-
tion as a policy option and communicates this intention to other par-
ties. It ends when the parties agree to formal negotiations (an
exchange of proposals designed to arrive at a mutually acceptable
outcome in a situation of interdependent interests) or when one party
abandons the consideration of negotiation as an option.33
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In other words, it is the period when the protagonists begin to shift from a
combative to a collaborative orientation, and start to accept that their goals will
be better achieved through cooperation. This change in outlook is a necessary
precondition for conflict resolution and represents a profound paradigm shift in
the parties’ thinking, often greater than anything involved in the final agreed out-
come. Mediators have an important, although often unrecognized role, during
this phase. Their actions can reinforce the parties’ cooperative mentality and help
build the foundations for a relationship capable of withstanding the inevitable
problems that arise during the substantive negotiations.
Two key lessons regarding mediator’s roles during pre-negotiation emerge
from the Mozambique peace process. First, mediators may need to engage in
negotiator training, particularly of the rebel representatives who may be under-
prepared and lack the resources for diplomatic bargaining. As early as December
1990, it became clear to the mediators at Sant’Egidio that the Renamo negotia-
tors were struggling with the demands of the negotiation and would need help at
several levels.34 In the early stages of the talks Renamo needed help to define its
goals and objectives, a necessity for keeping the negotiations moving forward. In
fact, the mediators suspended the talks in January 1991 for this purpose:
[T]he mediators were concerned that RENAMO was unprepared to
negotiate the political items, such as the political party law, due for
discussion next. RENAMO, while it espoused a commitment to
democratic principles, had no experience in negotiating for the kind
of practical arrangements and compromises needed to give these
policies concrete meaning.35
Strong encouragement from the mediators motivated Renamo into preparing a
number of documents that defined its position on constitutional issues and on the
transition period. For this task Renamo looked to outside legal experts from
South Africa and the US for help in conceptualizing and articulating their ideas.
The role of helping the parties define their objectives and goals is vital not only
to the smooth functioning of the negotiation, but also for the integrity of the
process. If one side later feels that it was unprepared and unclear about its objec-
tives, there may be a suspicion that they were taken advantage of, which in turn,
could undermine their commitment to the final agreement. Later, of course,
Renamo had to go through the necessary and more difficult process of trans-
forming itself from a guerrilla movement into a political party. The difficulties of
this process should not be under-estimated and mediators in internal conflicts
must remain cognizant of the potential ways in which they can assist the non-
state parties in particular.
Related to this issue, designing an effective framework during the pre-
negotiation phase involves dealing with the resource asymmetry of the parties.
That is,
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Good process design entails ensuring that resources on all sides are
distributed equitably. That will mean allowing time for preparation,
education and familiarization with the process of negotiation. A gov-
ernment with its full-scale administrative capacity, advisors and
resources, is obviously at a huge negotiating advantage over a small
insurrectionist movement with a handful of lieutenants more famil-
iar with military tactics than political discourse. Suddenly, they must
act as a fully fledged political party, when in fact they have had lit-
tle opportunity to develop such skills.36
The mediators in Rome, lacking in material resources themselves, arranged for
donors to provide Renamo with the kind of material support it needed for both
the negotiations and its transformation into a political force.37 The Italian gov-
ernment paid most of Renamo’s expenses in Rome, while a coalition of states
organized for a secure communications link between the Rome negotiators and
Renamo headquarters. Later, the UN established a $15 million political trust fund
to pay the parties to convert to politics.38
Another key area of training lies in helping the parties to communicate
more effectively and in a less hostile manner. In deep-rooted internal conflicts,
“parties who come to the negotiating table carry with them an abiding experience
of conflict, struggle and war. The exercise of force has been their dominant, per-
haps only, mode of engagement.”39 This is especially true for non-state actors,
who may also simply be unaccustomed to the language of diplomacy. As Andrea
Bartoli, a spokesperson for Sant’Egidio, stated:
[T]he essence of Sant’Egidio’s work was to find ways to express
RENAMO’s ideas in terms consistent with the overall goal of recon-
ciliation. Often the language of RENAMO’s initial positions was
either threatening or uncompromising. The government, accustomed
to legal and diplomatic language, had less need of such assistance.40
Naturally, this kind of assistance does not apply just to the pre-negotiation phase.
Throughout the negotiations, mediators must continue to facilitate communica-
tion and improve the quality of the dialogue. However, in the pre-negotiation
phase, when trust is still fragile and a cooperative relationship has not yet been
established, it is particularly vital that the parties learn to express themselves in
ways that will facilitate openness and cooperation, rather than generate more
hostility. On a practical level Renamo lacked the normal diplomatic channels of
communication between the rebel leadership and the negotiators in Rome. This
led to a level of inflexibility on the part of Renamo, who often maintained that
they could not proceed until they had re-established contact with their leaders. In
the end the mediators had to engage the services of several governments, and
even Roland “Tiny” Rowland, the CEO of Lonrho, to create a more efficient and
secure line of communication between the Rome representatives and the rebel
leadership. 
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A final area of training that mediators may need to engage in to ensure the
integrity of the process is educating the parties about how mediation works and
how to employ more effective negotiating tactics. A fascinating instance of such
training occurred in November 1991, when Renamo had to be assisted in their
negotiating tactics:
Hume explained that when parties agree to a mediation, they are usu-
ally willing to work from a mediator’s draft, especially after such a
draft is already before the parties. If one of the parties then puts for-
ward a competing draft, this action disrupts the negotiations and can
be interpreted as a sign that the proposing party has lost faith in the
mediation. Such a tactic is legitimate if one wants to get a position
across in the strongest way, taking the risk of discrediting the medi-
ation and perhaps breaking off the talks. To use the tactic after only
a few days of talks seemed unnecessary [ . . . ] Hume suggested that
a more effective tactic might be to insist that RENAMO’s points be
included in an amended mediator’s draft. If RENAMO did not allow
the mediators to resume the work of preparing the negotiating texts,
it would give the unavoidable impression that RENAMO had decid-
ed to obstruct negotiations.41
Another key objective of the mediator during the pre-negotiation phase must
include building a relationship of trust between the protagonists – and between
the mediator and the protagonists – based on increasing levels of cooperation. In
the first instance the mediators build trust by adhering to standards of strict
impartiality in their dealings with the parties. This step is crucial in internal con-
flicts, even if it is a contested notion in the context of inter-state conflict.42
Building trust and creating momentum can also be achieved through log-rolling,
a process where agreement is sought on small, relatively easy issues first to cre-
ate a sense of momentum. A tactic that the Sant’Egidio mediators frequently used
to this end was the Single Negotiation Text, which could be passed back and
forth between the parties. Small amendments by either side gradually built
momentum and a history of compromise that assisted the mediators in obtaining
compromises later on the more difficult issues. Often, the mediators would delib-
erately put aside or delay problematic issues, thereby preventing them from
becoming a point of contention or an impasse.
Coordination and Avoiding Mediator “Crowdedness”
A frequent problem in international mediation is what has been called
mediator “crowdedness,”43 a situation where numerous third parties each pursue
their own strategy in a series of disparate and uncoordinated attempts to domi-
nate the peace process. In many cases, mediators’ competing agendas provide the
parties with the opportunity to play the mediators off against each other, most
often with disastrous results for the peace process. The mediation in the
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Mozambique conflict was remarkable for the degree to which mediator “crowd-
edness” was avoided through early and continuous consultation, and coordina-
tion between different types of mediators – state, UN, and non-official – was
maintained throughout the negotiations. Such a sustained and focused mediation
by a wide array of mediators has rarely been recorded in any recent internal con-
flicts.
As early as August 1990, it was agreed that the Sant’Egidio representatives
would be the sole mediators, while the other parties with an active interest in
pushing forward the peace process – Italy, Kenya, Zimbabwe, the UN, the US –
would take on other important non-mediating roles, such as providing hospitali-
ty and logistic support, advising either side, supplying experts, and guaranteeing
any eventual agreement.44 In fact, meetings had to be held with Kenyan officials
to try and convince them not to mediate, and to allow the Sant’Egidio represen-
tatives to take full control of the process. Later, in October 1991, the Kenyans
again tried to insert themselves into the mediation process, this time by offering
to facilitate direct talks between Dhlakama and US officials. The US resisted this
move, stating that they still wanted to “support the negotiations in Rome and had
no intention of doing anything to replace the Italian mediation.”45 On 31 October
1991, the US met with the mediators to try and coordinate the gradual involve-
ment of additional governments into the process with the least disruption.46
Such continual and careful cooperation between potential mediators is
rare. In the former Yugoslavia, for example, multiple diplomatic interventions by
the UN, the EU, the Contact Group, NATO, and at one stage, former US presi-
dent Jimmy Carter, created confusion and opportunities for manipulation by the
protagonists.47 Avoiding mediator “crowdedness,” therefore, is an important goal
of any intervention in internal conflicts. At times, mediators need to be as aware
of potential interference from other third parties as they are of spoiling tactics by
the parties themselves, and may need to forcefully restrain other interested actors
from starting their own competing mediation track.
Another important lesson involves coordinating the activities of different
types of third parties, usually according to their capabilities and strengths.
Throughout the 11 rounds of talks, different actors undertook different roles in
an unprecedented display of international coordination. Rarely does one media-
tor have the necessary resources, abilities, or relationship with the parties to play
all the roles needed for keeping the process moving, especially in complex and
intractable internal conflicts. The primary role of the Italian government, for
example, was to provide hospitality and logistic support to the parties, something
the mediators would have been unable to do on their own given their lack of
resources. Even Roland “Tiny” Rowland provided vital transportation on his cor-
porate jet for Renamo representatives.48 The UN and other agencies, such as
ICRC, were also brought into the talks at various points to coordinate different
levels of assistance, such as ongoing humanitarian assistance. In particular, the
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UN was given the task of establishing a peacekeeping force and implementation
plan for the post-settlement transition period. Finally, a number of states collec-
tively expressed their willingness to act as guarantors of the agreement. This
afforded a degree of reassurance to the parties that the mediators on their own –
as non-official actors – could not provide, and gave them some measure of con-
fidence in the overall process. In short, the Mozambique case demonstrates the
clear potential of a constructive interface between official and unofficial diplo-
macy, and in the range of approaches to dealing with internal conflicts “the use
of track II in seriatim with track I appears to be one of the most useful.”49
Both the Mozambique peace process and empirical studies suggest that
high-ranking officials, like heads of state or rebel leaders, can be effective as
impasse-breakers in both negotiation and mediation,50 yet another important part
of coordinating the activities of different kinds of mediators. At various points
during the different rounds of negotiations, the US, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Italy
backed up the mediators’ efforts by applying pressure on the parties to make con-
cessions. This coordinated use of political and material leverage, which the non-
official mediators distinctly lacked, complemented the mediators’ use of moral
leverage. For example, at the 5-7 August 1992 summit when President Chissano
and Dhlakama met for their first face-to-face talks, the mediators brought in
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Italian officials to reassure and pres-
sure the parties into agreeing to a final timetable for concluding the talks.51 On
the negotiation side, the involvement of the two main leaders – Chissano and
Dhlakama – helped overcome blockages that lower-level representatives were
unable to circumvent. 
Another lesson related to the need for coordination and utilizing the
strengths of different third parties is that a wide range of experts – in the military,
constitutional, electoral, and economic development fields – need to be included
in the agreement design phase of the mediation. The US, for example, provided
experts in demobilization and ceasefire observation, along with constitutional
experts, to help the parties construct workable and effective mechanisms and
processes. Often these technical experts would operate parallel to the main medi-
ation. They provided assurances to the parties that the mediators’ proposals were
workable. Additionally, agreements on technical issues sometimes had a flow-on
effect to the main negotiations. As has been suggested, for non-state actors like
Renamo expert help was vital in transforming their organization from a guerril-
la force into a political party and for translating their loosely formed ideas into
clear political objectives.
Into the Implementation Phase
A key lesson that emerges from the Mozambique peace process is that
there needs to be long-term engagement into the implementation and post-con-
flict reconstruction phases. It is at this point that mediators are most needed, and
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yet frequently, as in the Middle East, it is at this stage that they are most often
absent. As we have said, there was an early commitment by the UN and the wider
international community to guarantee the Mozambique pact. On conclusion of
the GPA in October 1992, the UN authorized the extensive United Nations
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Over the next two years, thousands of
peacekeepers, aid, and development specialists, and over one billion dollars were
invested in relief and reconstruction. 
At the same time a key feature of the Rome peace agreement had been the
establishment of a “Supervisory and Monitoring Commission” (CSC). Its pur-
pose was to “supervise the cease-fire and monitor respect for and implementa-
tion of the agreements between the Parties within the framework of these nego-
tiations.”52 Composed of representatives of Frelimo, Renamo, France, Italy, the
UK, the US, the OAU, and the UN, the Commission became one of the key
mechanisms for sustaining the implementation process. In particular, Aldo
Ajello, the UN’s Special Representative in Mozambique, managed to build real
trust with the parties and played a critical role at crucial moments in overcoming
political obstacles to the implementation of the GPA.53 Along with Ajello, the
CSC actively engaged with the parties in problem-solving, confidence-building,
and, when necessary, the direct mediation of disputes over implementation
issues. In this way the international guarantors were able to ensure the proper and
full implementation of the agreements – unlike the implementation of the Oslo
Accords in Israel-Palestine or the Lusaka Accords in Angola.
The sustained engagement of the international guarantors in the process
extended up to and even beyond the national elections held in October 1994, two
years after the Rome Accords. When Renamo announced that it was withdraw-
ing for 24 hours during the actual balloting, the response was swift and forceful.
Special Representative Ajello, Western ambassadors, the heads of neighboring
states, and a senior representative of the new South African government all
applied the greatest diplomatic pressure on Dhlakama.54 Almost at once Renamo
announced that it was back in and the crisis was averted. It was continual inter-
vention like this that ensured the largely successful implementation of the Rome
Accords.
There is little question that during the implementation phase, any number
of disputes or problems could have derailed the entire process. The long-term
and sustained commitment shown by the international guarantors was a key fac-
tor in forestalling such a return to open conflict. In too many other cases – Chad,
Angola, Israel-Palestine, Liberia – the failure to sustain any such long-term com-
mitment into the implementation phase played a large part in the failure of peace
to take hold. In addition, the kind of post-settlement engagement practiced in
Mozambique was also important:
By including a strong humanitarian component in ONUMOZ, the
UN established a critical linkage between conflict resolution and
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peacebuilding in Mozambique. The various programmes – dealing
with issues such as the reintegration of former soldiers into civilian
life, humanitarian assistance, and the resettlement of refugees and
displaced people – were undertaken without looking at the political
affiliation of the beneficiaries. This served to reunify and reconcile
individuals who had been separated for years, many for no other rea-
son than the fact that they had held different political opinions. By
helping to establish relationships between individuals supporting dif-
ferent parties in the conflict, the UN ensured that the social base of
the conflict became a strong peace constituency.55
Importantly, the decision to demobilize the opposing forces before the national
elections was critical to the overall success of the peace process. In Angola, the
UN’s failure to demilitarize the electoral process led directly to renewed fighting
when UNITA lost the elections in 1992. The timely and judicious enactment of a
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program circumvented
the possibility of a similar outcome in Mozambique.
Mediation “Ripeness”
A final lesson from Mozambique, oft repeated but nonetheless true, is that
there is no substitute for the parties’ own willingness to seek a peaceful solution.
Without it, all outside interventions are likely to fail. This willingness is thought
to come from what has been called conflict “ripeness,” a term describing the
changes in circumstances that seem to propel the parties toward peace rather than
war. It does not imply that a peaceful solution is automatic, but rather that the
external and internal conditions are propitious for pursuing certain kinds of
peace-oriented policies. The hard work of conflict resolution must still be done
with great care and diligence, but under “ripe” conditions it will more likely lead
to success than when the conflict is not “ripe.” 
It is clear that the situation in Mozambique in late 1989 was “ripe” for an
attempt at conflict resolution. Several factors had conspired to propel the parties
toward a peaceful settlement. First, by the late 1980s, the parties had clearly
reached what has been termed a “mutually hurting stalemate,”56 where neither
the government nor the insurgents could attain their objectives through military
action. After more than one million fatalities, more than two million displaced
people,57 a devastated national infrastructure, and the end of external support for
both sides, exhaustion had set in and the belligerents were compelled to re-eval-
uate their war strategies and seriously consider a negotiated settlement. The pres-
sure only increased in 1991 and 1992 with a severe drought in the region.
Combined with ongoing economic crisis, the drought created a disastrous
humanitarian situation in the countryside – Renamo’s main zone of operation –
and threatened the rebel movement’s ability to sustain itself in the rural areas.58
Second, a change in the external environment of the war took place. At the
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wider global level the end of the Cold War resulted in declining superpower
sponsorship of ideologically driven conflicts like the Renamo-Frelimo conflict.
Regionally, peace was being negotiated in Namibia and Angola, and surrounding
states were growing weary of having to deal with the consequences of the war,
particularly the vast numbers of refugees and disruptions to regional transport
systems. In South Africa, the de Klerk government visited Maputo in July 1989,
and agreed to end aid to Renamo, effectively cutting off its main source of exter-
nal support.59 At the same time, Mozambique lacked the vast mineral wealth that
continued to drive the war in Angola. Rather, it was almost entirely dependent on
external aid flows and by the late 1980s, donors were showing greater and
greater levels of willingness to use this leverage over the Frelimo government to
sue for peace. If Mozambique wanted acceptance as a Western economic partner,
peace with Renamo would be have to be the quid pro quo.60
Third, there were a number of internal changes within the parties them-
selves. For example, in the late 1980s a new generation of Frelimo leaders
showed greater willingness to contemplate a dialogue with Renamo. There is lit-
tle doubt that the emergence of the more moderate Joachim Chissano as presi-
dent of Mozambique after 1986, replacing the hard-line Machel government,
also gave impetus to the change in attitude.61 Similarly, Frelimo as a party under-
went a profound transformation after 1989, changing itself from a vanguard party
to a mass party and widening its top-level ethnic representation to include groups
historically associated with Renamo. It also abandoned Marxism, committed
itself to multi-party democracy, and opened the way for direct talks with
Renamo.62 A similar transformation took place in Renamo under the leadership
of Dhlakama, and in 1989 Renamo abandoned many of its preconditions for
negotiations, unlocking the way for direct talks.
In short, the success of the Mozambique peace process was the “result of
a gradually growing and mutually painful stalemate, which was gradually trans-
formed from a ripe moment to a comprehensive set of agreements by a complex
array of mediators.”63 The context, in other words, provided the opportunity for
peace, but an appropriate model of mediation was needed to translate the oppor-
tunity into success.
CONCLUSION
Several policy proposals follow from this study. First, international organ-
izations and states concerned about intervening in an internal conflict need to
have systems in place for identifying potential non-official mediators from
among the local and international NGO community. This requirement obviously
involves greater networking with the NGO community, and establishing forums
for exchange and cooperation. Second, special care needs to be directed toward
establishing trust and training the parties during the pre-negotiation phase. The
temptation to move straight into public negotiations must be resisted. Third,
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much greater attention needs to be paid to the question of coordination. As early
as possible, competing and multiple mediation strands need to be drawn into a
single thread and the potential roles of third parties need to be carefully moni-
tored. Where one actor can exercise leverage to break impasses, for example,
care must be taken that it is done to promote the overall aims of the mediation
and not just particularist interests. Fourth, in addition to involving non-state
actors, experts will need to be contracted in to the talks so that genuinely work-
able solutions can be formulated. Experts and lessons learned in the areas of
ceasefires, disarmament, and demobilization, and constitution writing need to be
on hand during the talks. Lastly, a specific plan for the implementation period
must be established, as well as mechanisms for following through: short-term
goals of securing a ceasefire or a settlement will not suffice on their own.
The success of the Mozambique peace process was the result of three key
related factors: a ripe moment, an appropriate mediation model, and a sustained
and committed intervention. The potential for resolving internal conflicts is max-
imized when all three factors are present. External actors cannot artificially cre-
ate a ripe moment or induce the protagonists’ willingness to settle peacefully.
What external actors can do, however, is to adopt a model of mediation that is
more suited to the kind of conflict they are attempting to intervene in, to coordi-
nate their activities with wider peace-building efforts, and to make sure that they
have a long-term commitment to see the process through to its full implementa-
tion and beyond. 
There is a final factor which would seem to be important in any assessment
of the Mozambique peace process, and it takes us back to Lederach’s notion that
building cultures of peace in war-torn societies involves a holistic approach that
engages the power brokers, the power holders, and civil society. More by hap-
penstance than by design, the peace process in Mozambique came to include all
of three elements. As we have described, there was a mediated settlement
between the power brokers – the leadership of Renamo and Frelimo. At the level
of the power holders there were a number of key individuals, such as Dr. Brazao
Mazula, the president of the National Electoral Commission, who were genuine
consensus builders that kept the process on track by convincing their colleagues
to rise above petty party politics.64 And at the level of civil society, it has been
noted that:
At the grassroots level the desire of ordinary Mozambicans for peace
has been the main factor propelling the peace process forwards.
While the UN, Frelimo and Renamo have maneuvered for political
advantage, struggled with internal bureaucratic and political divi-
sions, and revealed a limited capacity to deliver what is agreed upon,
ordinary Mozambicans – soldiers, churchmen, petty officials, dis-
placed men and women, local chiefs – individually and collectively
have grabbed the initiative and created their own “peace agreements”
at the local level.65
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In other words, Mozambique is more than just an example of an alternative
model of mediation in internal conflicts, important as that may be. It is also a
model of how an entire peace process can be constructed through all its neces-
sary phases from peace-making to peace-building. Furthermore, the durability of
the process – in spite of ongoing tensions and disputes between Renamo and
Frelimo, economic hardships brought on by structural adjustment, and the floods
of 2000 – gives pause for reflection on models of intervention in other internal
conflicts. This is not to say that there were no flaws in the Mozambique peace
process, or that it could not have been greatly improved in many aspects. Rather,
it is to suggest that compared to most other international interventions of this
kind (Angola, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, and others), this case
represents a giant leap forward in the search for appropriate models. Its lessons
need to be well learned.
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